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IMPARTIALITY IN JUDICIAL ETHICS:
A JURISPRUDENTIAL ANALYSIS
W.
I.

BRADLEY WENDEL*

INTRODUCTION

The fundamental value in judicial ethics is impartiality. This
means that ajudge is duty-bound to decide cases on their merits,
be open to persuasion, and not be influenced by improper considerations.' The paradigm case of unethical behavior by a judge
is taking a bribe to decide a case in favor of one of the parties.
This kind of corruption, which is fortunately rare in many developed countries, is also relatively uninteresting from an intellectual point of view. A more difficult case of failure of impartiality,
conceptually speaking, involves a judge who relies on extra-legal
factors as the basis for a judicial decision. Making sense of judicial ethics therefore requires a distinction between factors a
judge may take into account when rendering a decision and
those which are excluded from consideration. In American legal
discourse, this distinction is often stated in terms of law vs. politics, where "politics" is used to mean any normative view that is
not incorporated into the law. 2 This criticism-that judges act
unethically when they make decisions on the basis of politics, not
law-is familiar from high-profile cases such as the Bush v. Gore3
vote-recount litigation in 2000 and the ruling by a federal appeals
*

Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. This paper was originally

presented at the Special Workshop on Legal Ethics, at the 23rd World Congress

of Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, in Krakow, Poland. I am grateful to
Yasutomo Morigiwa for organizing the workshop and commenting on the
paper.
1. See, e.g.,
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT terminology at 8 (2004)
("'Impartiality' or 'impartial' denotes absence of bias or prejudice in favor of,
or against, particular parties or classes of parties, as well as maintaining an open
mind in considering issues that may come before the judge.").
2. See, e.g., DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION 24-25 (1997)
(arguing that a central project for jurisprudence is drawing a line between ideology and law, with only the latter being admitted as a legitimate ground for
judicial decision making). However, American lawyers and judges do not regard
it as improper to rely on "policy" arguments, which are, in effect, middle-level
principles of political morality that play a role in justifying legal decisions. Linguistically, it is unfortunate that two cognate words, "policy" and "politics," are
used to describe considerations that are appropriate and forbidden, respectively, in judicial decision making.
3. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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court (subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court) that the
inclusion of "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance recited in
public schools is unconstitutional.4 In contrast with legal decisions made by actors within the executive branch of government,
in which policy and ideological factors may play a role,5 judicial
decisions are supposed to be justified solely on the basis of legal
reasons.
The general theme of this Essay is that the role of the judge,
and the subject of judicial ethics, cannot be discussed in the
abstract; the analysis must have a foundation in some view about
the nature of law. Talking about "legal reasons" and criticizing
judges for relying on non-legal reasons presupposes a tenable distinction between the legal and non-legal domains. This, of
course, is one of the principal points of contention between legal
positivists and their critics. If there is one position that unites the
varieties of legal positivism, it is that the distinction between what
is law and what is not law is a social fact.6 If this is the case, then it
is an empirical matter to discover the content of the law-one
simply looks at the relevant sources to determine what judges
have relied upon as reasons for their decisions. Metaphorically,
one can draw a boundary line separating reasons that are
"inside" the law from those that are "outside" the law. Armed
with this information, one can then criticize, as failing to respect
the obligation of impartiality, judges who rely on reasons outside
the law. These excluded reasons could be political and ideological beliefs, personal relationships with the parties, the payment
of bribes, legally irrelevant facts or evaluations (such as the
wealth, status, or physical attractiveness of one of the parties),
and so on. On the other hand, if some kind of moral or political
argument is required to differentiate between law and non-law, it
is not simply an empirical matter to draw a boundary separating
inside from outside. The distinction between law and non-law
would be evaluative and contestable, and it would make reference to the very sorts of political, ideological, and policy reasons
that may or may not be part of the law. The claim that the possibility of a value-free distinction between law and non-law is
untenable is at the heart of Ronald Dworkin's theory of law.
Thus, the Hart/Dworkin debate will serve as the framework for
this Essay.
4. Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2003), revd sub. nom.
Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
5. Trevor W. Morrison, ConstitutionalAvoidance in the Executive Branch, 106
COLUM. L. Rv. 1189, 1194 (2006).
6. JOSEPH RAZ, Legal Positivism and the Sources of Law, in THE AUTHORITY OF
LAW 37, 37 (1979).
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More specifically, the Essay will discuss two aspects of the
law-politics distinction. First, principles of judicial impartiality
must take a position on the existence of judicial discretion and
the problem of legal interpretation. 7 In Hart's jurisprudence,
there are some questions to which a uniquely correct legal
answer cannot be given. As Hart noted, linguistic rules are to
some extent indeterminate in their application, due to the open
texture of language, the necessity of exercising judgment to
determine what fact situations fall under the specification of a
rule, and the plurality of aims that may be embodied in a rule.8
When a judge encounters some gap in the law, where it is clear
that there is no correct answer to the legal question, the judge
must exercise discretion and will in effect create new law.9 Dworkin, by contrast, denies that a judge has discretion in cases where
the application of a legal rule seems indeterminate. If the judge's
decision truly imposes duties on the parties, and is justified with
reference to the parties' rights, then there must be some authoritative source of rights-legal rules, standards, or principles-that
exists before the judge makes her decision and controls her decision making."0 Hart and Dworkin agree that judges are dutybound to follow the law and not make decisions on the basis of
ideology or personal preferences where there is applicable law
controlling the decision. The difference is that Dworkin thinks
there is always applicable law controlling the decision, while Hart
believes there are cases in which judges permissibly "legislate," or
make decisions on the basis of extra-legal considerations. For
Dworkin to sustain this claim, however, he must first provide
good reasons to believe that what look like extra-legal, normativepolitical reasons are actually part of the law.
The second area of discussion is the justification for certain
restrictions imposed on judges by positive law (rules of judicial
conduct, statutes, and court rules), often misleadingly referred to
as rules of 'judicial ethics." (Civilians may refer to these as the
dgontologie of judges.) At least in the United States, many of these
restrictions purport to regulate bias and the risk that judges will
not be impartial. For example, a federal statute permits a party to
7. See Kent Greenawalt, Discretionand the JudicialDecision: The Elusive Quest
for the Fetters that Bind Judges, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 359 (1975) (analyzing what he

calls the "no discretion" thesis of Dworkin and Sartorius).
8. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 126-29 (Penelope A.

Bulloch

&

Joseph Raz eds., 2d ed. 1994).

9.

Id. at 135-36, 145-47.

10. RONALD DWORKIN, Hard Cases, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81, 101-05
(1977) [hereinafter Hard Cases]; RONALD DWORKIN, The Model of Rules I, in TAKINC RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra, at 14, 32-34 [hereinafter The Model of Rules I].
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file a motion to disqualify a judge "in any proceeding in which
[the judge's] impartiality might reasonably be questioned."' 1
Courts applying the rules governing judicial conduct often regulate prophylactically, by disqualifying judges from presiding over
certain types of cases, based on conduct that is taken to be evidence of bias. This conduct can include speaking or writing publicly on controversial political and legal subjects, being a member
or serving on the board of directors of an organization with a
particular ideological viewpoint, or teaching at or attending continuing legal education seminars in which particular political
views are expressed. One of the recurring areas of controversy in
the application of these rules are cases in which the judge's
alleged failure of impartiality is related to having controversial
political or religious beliefs.
There are some interesting empirical issues that must be
passed over here including: (1) the validity in general of the
inference from conduct to stable dispositions or character traits
that can be used to reliably predict future behavior-many cognitive psychologists argue that affirming the validity of that inference is a mistake, i.e., the "fundamental attribution error"; 2 (2)
the relevance of the law vs. judges' political attitudes as a basis for
predicting judicial decisions-political scientists have proposed
and tested an "attitudinal model" for predicting decisions, which
asserts that political beliefs are a better predictor ofjudicial decisions than legal rules;'" and (3) the capacity of judges (or anyone, for that matter) to set aside irrelevant considerations and
decide cases on their merits.' 4 The normative question here,
however, is whether there is anything wrong with a judge basing
a legal decision, in whole or in part, on the sorts of considerations upon which anti-bias rules focus.
II.

CMLIAN AND COMMON LAW JUDGES

Before discussing these two issues, it is necessary to say something briefly on the difference between the judicial role in common law and civil law systems. It would not be appropriate (or at
least it would not be very interesting) for a paper aimed at an
international audience to focus only on decision making by common lawjudges. However, it may seem to civilian lawyers that this
11.
12.

28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2000).
See, e.g.,
JOHN M. DoRis, LACK OF CHARACTER 93-97 (2002).
13. See JEFFREY A. SECAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 65 (1993).
14. See Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Evidence?
The Difficulty of DeliberatelyDisregarding,153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1251-52 (2005).
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entire question is misplaced, because the official view of judges
in civil law systems is that they do not engage in interpretation at
all, but simply apply the code to the facts in a syllogistic way. The
judicial role is to find the right provision of the code, and reason
from that provision (the major premise) and the facts (the minor
premise) to the conclusion, which follows as a matter of deductive logic. 15 If there is any ambiguity in the code, the judge
should refer the question back to the legislature for resolution;
to do otherwise would be a violation of the separation of powers
between the judicial and legislative branches of government. The
judge is a "faithful agent of the statutory law,"' 6 who does not
have a personality of her own, does not engage in creative interpretation, and whose decisions do not themselves qualify as a
source of law.
Mitchel Lasser argues that this official portrait seriously misrepresents reality, thatjudges in civil law systems are aware of and
rely on policy reasons as a basis forjudicial decisions, that there is
uncertainty in the application of code provisions to the facts of
litigated disputes, and that the short, deductively reasoned judicial opinions published by civilian courts do not represent the
real reasons lying behind the decision. 17 Lasser goes so far as to
say that it is taken for granted that the code contains gaps, conflicts, and ambiguities; that the model of adjudication as deductive reasoning is untenable; and that the judiciary plays an
essential role in the creation and development of the law.'" He
quotes the author of a leading French treatise on civil law as saying that "the judge is a man and not a syllogism machine: he
judges by his intuition and his sensitivity as much as he does by
his knowledge of [legal] rules and by his logic."' 9 The French
judge therefore is concerned that legal decisions be equitable
and just, in the same way that common lawjudges are attentive to
policy considerations.
For example, in a tort case that reached the highest French
court, the Cour de Cassation,the legal issue was whether the plaintiff could recover general damages (what American lawyers
would call non-pecuniary damages) even if she was in a permanent vegetative state. Although the court's written opinion was,
as is typical, only three paragraphs long and extremely cryptic,
published academic commentary reveals that the judges were
15.
16.
17.
18.

19.
1967)).

JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIvIL LAW TRADITION

36 (2d ed. 1985).

MITCHEL DE S.-O.-L'E. LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS 37 (2004).
Id. at 42-44.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 45-46 (quoting JEAN CARBONNIER, 1 DROIT CIVIL 18 (7th ed.
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sensitive to policy considerations. 2' There are also internal (and
highly confidential) reports by judicial officers, the Advocate
General, and the Reporting Judge, which play an important role
in the court's decision-making process.2 1 Significantly, the
reports of these judicial officers make frequent reference to the
academic commentary which cites broader policy considerations,
beyond the statutory text, supporting judicial decisions. Examining these documents reveals that the court in the tort case was
concerned with its institutional relationships with other courts,
such as the Criminal Chamber, the lack of clarity in the law that
had arisen around the issue of general damages, the value of
human dignity that would be promoted by permitting the plaintiff in this case to recover, and pragmatic considerations such as
the difficulty of evaluating general damages awards. 2 American
lawyers would recognize these considerations as exactly the sorts
of policy reasons-i.e., middle-level principles of justice-that
figure prominently in the discourse of common law courts in tort
cases.
If this description of the French system in action is accurate,
it serves as a caution not to rely too heavily on the simplistic picture of civil lawjudges as mechanical decision makers. The difference between the French and the American systems, as typical
representatives of civil law and common law styles of adjudication, turns out to be in the candor with which judges disclose the
basis for their decisions in public opinions. However, the two systems are more similar than they may appear at first in terms of
the extent to which judicial decision making is not mechanical or
algorithmic, and judges must exercise discretion when deciding
cases. As a matter of legal theory, the same problem thus arises in
both systems-namely, what considerations are relevant to justifying a judicial decision. This is the philosophical problem with
which this Essay will be primarily concerned.
III.

LEGAL POSITIVISM AND JUDICIAL DISCRETION

On the assumption that judicial decision making is not
mechanical and thatjudges rely on considerations other than the
plain meaning of statutory texts and (in common law systems) a
narrow reading of the holdings of precedent cases, how can we
formulate a test for impartiality that differentiates between permissible and impermissible grounds for judicial decisions? For
the purposes of this discussion, assume a case similar to the one
20.
21.
22.

See id. at 40-42.
Id. at 47-49.
Id. at 40-44, 56-60.
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described by Lasser-a tort issue concerning the recoverability of
damages that might come before any appellate court. 23 The
plaintiff sought damages for emotional distress, as a result of having witnessed her husband, who was standing nearby, be struck
by a car driven by the defendant. She testified that she feared for
her own safety, even though she was not struck by the car. Moreover, she was so frightened that she became physically ill. 24 The
trial court dismissed the plaintiffs claim for damages on the
authority of a precedent case, which held that a plaintiff cannot
recover for emotional distress absent a physical impact upon the
plaintiff. 25 The reasons the court gave in the earlier case were as

follows:
" A person is legally responsible only for the natural and
proximate results of a negligent act. Physical illness is not
the natural and proximate result of fright in a person of
ordinary physical and mental vigor.26
* Awarding damages for emotional injury is unfair because
the defendant's liability2 7will be out of proportion to the
defendant's culpability.
" The magnitude of emotional injuries tends to be unforeseeable. It is unfair to impose liability for unforeseeable
harms, because there is no way the defendant could have
anticipated and prevented them.2 8
* Permitting the plaintiff to recover for emotional distress
in this case would "naturally result in a flood of litigation" because it is easy to feign emotional distress.2 9
* It is impossible to calculate the amount of recoverable
damages without speculation and conjecture."0
23. This discussion is based very loosely on a case from the Supreme
Court of NewJersey, Falzone v. Busch, 214 A.2d 12 (N.J. 1965). See also RONALD
DWORK1N, LAw's EMPIRE (1986) (using a similar example throughout to illustrate different conceptions of law and adjudication).
24. Cf Falzone, 214 A.2d at 13 (describing claim for damages by plaintiffs
wife on grounds that she feared for her own safety and not the safety of her
husband).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See id. at 14.
28. See id. at 15 (citing evidence to the contrary that fright may
foreseeably cause physical injury).
29. Id. at 14 (quoting Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 45 N.E. 354, 354
(N.Y. 1896)).
30. Id. at 15. In the United States this argument has an institutional-competence aspect, because non-expert juries assign damages to the plaintiff, subject to some modification by the trial judge.
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The judge must now decide what to do in the present case. The
jurisprudential question this raises is what law governs the
judge's decision. The question forjudicial ethics is what the value
of impartiality requires. My suggestion is that the answers to
these questions are intimately related: an impartial judge is one
who follows the law, but ascertaining the content of the law is
quite a bit less clear than scholars of judicial ethics tend to
assume.
Dworkin hints at this connection when he says that 'judicial
decisions in civil cases ...

characteristically are and should be gen-

erated by principle not policy."" l For Dworkin, the distinction
between reasons of principle and reasons of policy is that principles can be shown to be consistent with past political decisions
made by other officials (judges and legislators) within a general
political theory thatjustifies those decisions.3 2 Policy reasons, in
contrast with principles, may refer to moral norms but these are
not norms that belong to this particularsociety's political morality. 3 Reasons of principle are therefore "inside" a particular society's law, and reasons of policy are "outside" the law of that
community; but note that for Dworkin, "the law" must be understood in an idiosyncratic way. Hart claims that for any legal system, there is a master rule for distinguishing law from non-law;
this is the rule of recognition. 4 He further insists that the existence and content of the law can be determined without reference to moral criteria.3 5 Dworkin challenges both the existence
of a rule of recognition and the content-independence of law.
He denies that a rule of recognition can ever be formulated
because moral argumentation is necessary to establish the existence of legal principles.3 6 Reasons of principle are controversial
in the sense that they cannot simply be "read off" the law in a
straightforward way, without arguing that they are justified on
the basis of the normative political theory.3 7 There can be no
source-based criteria for identifying legal principles. 38 Further,
31. Hard Cases, supra note 10, at 84 (emphasis added).
32. See id. at 87-88.
33. See id. at 90-92; The Model of Rules I, supra note 10, at 22.
34. See HART, supra note 8, at 100-10.
35. Id. at 269; see also H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM 243 (1982)
(stressing the content-independence of law in papers written after the first edition of Hart's book The Concept of Law).
36. See Hard Cases, supra note 10, at 90; The Model of Rules I, supra note 10,
at 40-41, 43.
37. RONALD DWORKIN, The Model of Rules II, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY,
supra note 10, at 46, 65-68.
38. But see JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 194-221 (1994)
(defending a source-based criteria).
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according to Dworkin, we must believe in the existence of legal
principles in order to account for what a judge is doing when he
or she decides a case in which existing law does not unambiguously determine the result. In Dworkin's view, a judge should
never step outside existing law and make new law, for to do so
would be to retroactively confer new rights on the parties.3 9
In the tort case example, "the law" consists most obviously of
a rule-"no liability for emotional distress without physical
impact." In addition to that rule, however, the law arguably consists of the reasons given by judges in support of that rule, as well
as reasons given in other cases that tend to support a very different rule. Other cases might have permitted recovery, albeit in
circumstances that are factually distinguishable from the exact
case before the court, citing reasons such as the importance of
deterring wrongdoing; the injustice of permitting an injury to an
innocent victim to go uncompensated; the anomaly that recovery
for emotional distress is permitted in cases where there is some
physical impact, however slight; and the ability of trial courts,
using rules of evidence and their power to reduce excessive damage awards, to provide adequate guidance to juries in the assessment of damages. In our hypothetical, it is unclear how a judge
should decide the case. Some judges might read the precedent
case narrowly and deny recovery to the plaintiff; other judges
might read the precedent case more broadly and permit the
plaintiff to recover damages. We recognize the possibility of a
reasoned discourse contesting the outcomes of these cases. The
interesting jurisprudential question, which will shed light on the
judicial-ethics question, is what accounts for the disagreement
between these judges. There are at least four positions, although
I think only the first two are plausible descriptions of how adjudication works in practice.
Position (1): Dworkin would say there is some uncertainty
over the grounds of law, by virtue of which a proposition of law
(e.g., "the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages for emotional
distress without a physical impact") may be deemed true or
false.' Dworkin's position is a challenge to Hart's view that the
authority of law is a function of a convention among judges of
making reference to certain considerations when deciding
cases.41 It amounts to a denial of the view that "social facts are
what make rule-of-recognition statements true, and therefore
39.

Hard Cases, supra note 10, at 81; The Model of Rules I, supra note 10, at

40.
41.

DWORKIN,

30.
supra note 23, at 4.

See Scott J. Shapiro, The "Hart-Dworkin"Debate: A Short Guide for the
Perplexed, in RONALD DWORKIN (Arthur Ripstein ed., 2007).
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social facts are what make it the case that the law is one way
rather than another."4 2 According to Dworkin, there seems to be
no stable convention of relying on, or excluding reliance on, certain considerations as the grounds of law. Some of the reasons
cited by judges in support of their decisions are part of the
grounds of law, but others are just rhetorical flourishes or irrelevant references to extra-legal policy considerations. The only way
to know the difference is to ask what the point is of having law,
and make political arguments about the function of law in our
society.43 The boundary between "inside" the law and "outside"
the law is therefore contestable and requires normative political
arguments to establish. A judge's decision must fit with existing
precedents, and "the actual political history of his community
will sometimes check his other political convictions," but once a
possible interpretation passes a threshold of fit, the judge must
apply "[h] is own moral and political convictions" to say what the
law of the community is. 44
Position (2): A positivist could avoid the force of Dworkin's
objection by arguing that the law is one thing, and its application
is another.4 5 The inside/outside boundary is relatively determinate, and may be ascertained empirically. Rule-of-recognition
statements can still be evaluated on social facts. In addition to
criteria for determining the content of the law, there are also
"standards that determine acceptable methods of interpreting
and applying" legal norms.4 6 It is important not to confuse questions pertaining to the content of law with questions about its
application. Any normative arguments concerning the nature of
judging pertain to these latter standards, not to the content of
the law (i.e., are not contests over the specification of the rule of
recognition, but its application)." One might even observe that
Dworkin's own theory does not exclude this second possibility.
He argues that ascertaining the law on any issue requires the
judge to ask which interpretation (of the statute or the precedents) will show the existing law of this community in its best
light.4 8 A judge asking this question may, in effect, be asking
42. Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Model of Social Facts, in HART'S POSTSCRIPT
223 (Jules Coleman ed., 2001).
43. See DWORKIN, supra note 23, at 65-68.
44. Id. at 255-56.
45. See E. Philip Soper, Legal Theory and the Obligation of ajudge: The Hart!
Dworkin Dispute, in RONALD DWORKIN AND CONTEMPORARY JURISPRUDENCE 8
(Marshall Cohen ed., 1984).
46. Id.
47. SeeJules L. Coleman, Negative and PositivePositivism, in RONALD DWoRKIN AND CONTEMPORARY JURISPRUDENCE, supra note

48.

45.

DwoRJKN, supra note 23, at 52, 90, 225, 256.

2008]

IMPARTIAITY IN JUDICIAL ETHICS: AJURISPRUDENTIAL ANALYSIS

315

whether normative political theory requires including a given
reason as part of the grounds of the law, but she could also be
asking, in effect, whether normative political theory entails standards for applying the law that gives that consideration greater
weight in judicial deliberations.
Position (3): The "official" theory of judging embraced by
the civil law-that the judge is merely "the mouth that pronounces the words of the law" 4 -would admit no uncertainty
with respect to either the grounds of law or the methods of its
application. Comparative law scholars have shown, however, that
judges may write as if legaljudgments were exercises in deductive
logical reasoning, but in fact there is a great deal of ambiguity
and uncertainty in the law, and therefore room for discretionary
decision making by judges. Because of the open texture of language, general rules can never determine their own application;
thus, adhering to the "official" theory of mechanical judging has
only the effect of disguising the need for the exercise of
discretion.5"
Position (4): The radical indeterminacy thesis, associated
with some strands of the American legal realist and critical legal
studies movements, is that law does not constrain the decisions of
judges. The domains of law and politics are extensionally identical, so to the extent judges seem to be appealing to specific legal
norms, they are doing so merely to camouflage the true political
basis of their decisions. There are numerous well known
problems with this position. For one thing, as Hart pointed out, a
judge who believes that her decisions are unconstrained by law
would be unable to think of herself as a judge, as opposed to a
private citizen.5 1 In order for a legal system to exist, judges must
take the internal point of view toward the rule of recognition and
regard it as stating a genuine obligation. "2 The radical indeterminacy thesis cannot account for the normativity of law-that is, its
capacity to create obligations on the part ofjudges to justify their
decisions on the grounds of law. A related problem, which will be
important to the discussion of judging in good faith in the following section, is that the claim of radical indeterminacy con49.

LASSER, supra note 16, at 37 (quoting CHARLES DE MONTESQUIEU, THE
OF THE LAWS 163 (Anne M. Cohler et al. trans. & eds., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1989) (1748)).
50. HART, supra note 8, at 129.
SPIRIT

51. Id. at 136.
52. Id. at 116 ("[If the rule of recognition] is to exist at all, [it] must be
regarded from the internal point of view as a public, common standard of correctjudicial decision, and not as something which each judge merely obeys for
his part only.").
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fuses causal explanations with justifications of judicial decisions.53
A reason that may be given as an explanation of a judicial decision (e.g., that a judge has a particular partisan or ideological
commitment) may be insufficient as a justification.
To see how this jurisprudential issue makes a practical difference in judicial ethics, imagine two different judges considering
the hypothetical tort case. One is ideologically committed to the
free market, distrusts government regulation, thinks industries
do a fairly good job of voluntary compliance with reasonable
norms of public safety, believes in principles of individual liberty
and personal responsibility, and resists any attempt to redistribute wealth on a more egalitarian basis. The second judge takes a
dim view of the willingness of businesses to comply with their
social responsibilities and of whether they can be trusted with
self-regulation, believes that market failure and consumer irrationality justify more extensive government regulation, and
abhors gross inequalities of wealth and favors progressive taxation and income redistribution. (In the United States these positions correspond roughly with the Republican and Democratic
parties, respectively, so for convenience we can refer to these
judges as the Republican and Democratic judges.) The ethical
question would be uninteresting, however, if it were the case
either that the law were perfectly determinate or it were completely indeterminate. If position (4) were correct and these two
judges could decide the case on the basis of their ideological
convictions and not be deemed to have reached a legally incorrect result, then presumably they would simply follow their political preferences and provide a post hoc legal justification. On the
other hand, if position (3) were correct and the application of
the law to the facts of this case were a matter of syllogistic deduction, the political viewpoints of the judges would be irrelevant, as
any competent reasoner would reach the same conclusion.
There are interesting questions ofjudicial ethics only if, as I
believe is the case, legal decision making is neither a species of
deductive logic nor subject to the unconstrained whims or purely
political beliefs of judges. In that case, judges can disagree in
good faith about the right decision in hard cases. The Hart/
Dworkin debate boils down to the question of what judges are
doing when they disagree about the right decision in hard cases.
Position (1), above, represents Dworkin's argument that the disagreement is over whether some consideration is part of the law
or not. Position (2) takes the content of the law as given by social
53.
1992).

STEVENJ. BURTONJUDGING IN GOOD FAITH

43-47 (Julie Coleman ed.,
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sources and maintains that the disagreement is over how legal
reasons should be prioritized or balanced. Normative political
(i.e., non-legal) arguments within these positions pertain to
whether something ought to be considered part of the law (position (1)) or how legal reasons should be ranked and weighted
(position (2)). Applying these positions to our example, the
Republican and Democratic judges would view the tort case as
follows.
Position (1) (Dworkin): Reasons given by the judge in the precedent case (that it is unfair to impose liability for harms that are
unforeseeable, etc.) and in other analogous cases must be understood as arguments of political theory about what the law should
be. 54 The practice of making and justifying legal judgments is
normative all the way down. In order to decide the tort case, a
judge "must find, if he can, some coherent theory about legal
rights" which accounts for and justifies all relevant prior legislation and judicial decisions in the area." Because one can tell a
"Republican" story and a "Democratic" story to explain and justify the existing law of emotional distress damages, it is the task of
each judge to engage "[h] is own moral and political convictions"
to determine the content of the law. 56 When the judge has done
this, the judge is not creating new law, but discovering what the
law is, even though political argument was required to ascertain
the content of the law. 57 This position raises the possibility that
the Republican judge could decide the case one way (probably
denying recovery of emotional distress damages) and the Democratic judge could reach the opposite result (permitting recovery), and both could claim that they are giving an account of the
law as it actually existed, prior to their decision. This is a consequence of the "Protestantism" of Dworkin's theory of law.58
Dworkin believes that even though people who participate in the
same social practice share various background understandings
about their common form of life, there is often not consensus on
the best constructive interpretation of law that will show the community's political morality in its best light.5 9 Interpretation is
54. DWORKIN, supra note 23, at 248 ("[A judge] must decide which interpretation shows the legal record to be the best it can be from the standpoint of
substantive political morality.") (emphasis added).

55.
56.
57.

Id. at 240.
Id. at 256.
Id. at 260-61.

58. See Gerald J. Postema, "Protestant"Interpretationand Social Practices,6 L.
& PHIL. 283, 296 (1987).

59.

Id. at 297-98.
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therefore "insufficiently intersubjective"6 to ensure that judges
are not simply enacting their own political preferences under the
guise of interpreting the law.
Position (2) (Hart): To the extent judges make a conventional
practice of relying on certain considerations, the reasons given in
past cases can be identified as law without resort to normative
political theory. If there is an area of indeterminacy in the law,
judges must exercise discretion, weigh and balance the relevant
considerations, and reach the best judgment they can, understanding that they are, in effect, creating new law.61 There may
be standards, such as principles of judicial craft, that constrain
this decision. Alternatively, a judge may look to the community's
62
moral standards to fill gaps and resolve ambiguities in the law.
In the tort case, Republican and Democratic judges may differ in
the way they weigh and balance the competing considerations as
a normative political matter, but if they are honest about following community moral standards, their decisions may converge.
Similarly, if there are genuine principles of judicial craft that
constrain the way they weigh and prioritize the reasons identified
(via social facts) as part of the law, they may reach the same decision. However, neither of these sources of constraint on judicial
discretion seem adequate. Unless the community speaks with one
voice on matters of'justice, there is unlikely to be a consensus for
a conscientious judge to discover. The judge would therefore be
forced to select some aspect of the community's pluralistic, perhaps even contradictory, discourse about justice as the community's "real" political morality. At this point the neutral discovery
of social facts has ended, and the judge is engaging in political
argumentation. Appeals to a non-political craft of judging as the
exercise of Aristotelian practical wisdom run into the same problem of pluralism. Judgment for Aristotle is always exercised with
reference to some end of the practice in question, but in most
political communities there are multiple competing ends served
by the law.
IV.

JUSTIFYING RULES OF JUDICIAL ETHICS

The positive law of'judicial ethics is aimed at minimizing the
effect of the judge's political views on the outcomes of cases. For
example, the American Bar Association's Model Code of Judicial
Conduct prohibits judges from belonging to organizations where
60.
61.

62.
(1949).

Id. at 301.
HART, supra note 8, at 132-36.

See BENJAMIN

N. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
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membership in that organization would "cast reasonable doubt
on the judge's capacity to act impartially as a judge."'6 3 Continuing with the theme of the hypothetical tort case, in the United
States there are numerous interest and lobbying groups on both
sides of the tort reform debate-the Chamber of Commerce and
American Tort Reform Association on the side of manufacturers
and other businesses, and the American Trial Lawyers Association and consumer-protection associations like Public Citizen on
the other side. A judge's membership in one of these organizations might lead an observer to believe that the judge had
already made up her mind about the political issues in dispute in
the case, and would therefore be unable to decide the case
impartially. Other provisions of the rules ofjudicial ethics restrict
public comments by judges about pending cases,6 4 prohibit
judges from making "pledges, promises, or commitments that
are inconsistent" with impartial judging of cases,6 5 and require
judges to disqualify themselves from presiding over any case in
which their impartiality can reasonably be questioned.6 6 Judges
can potentially run afoul of these rules by, for example, writing
op-ed pieces in the newspaper criticizing another court's decision, advocating for a change in the law, or campaigning for judicial office on a political platform that explicitly or implicitly
suggests the outcome in certain cases. In each instance, the rationale behind the rule is that the judge's speech or conduct indicates an inability to decide cases impartially.
In the United States, where judges are either elected or
appointed in highly public, contentious processes, judges and
candidates for judicial office typically declare that they are able
to set aside their political beliefs and decide cases "on the law."67
However, the discussion of the Hart/Dworkin debate was
intended to show that the political viewpoints ofjudges may necessarily influence the outcomes of cases. In Dworkin's view, judging
is inherently a political practice, because ascertaining the con63. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4A(1) (2004). Membership in organizations "devoted to the improvement of the law, the legal system
or the administration of justice" is presumptively permitted. Id. Canon 4C(3).
However, this permission is qualified by the requirement that membership not
cast reasonable doubt on the judge's capacity to act impartially. Id. Canon
4C(3) cmt.
64. Id. Canon 3B(9).
65. Id. Canon 3B(10).
66. Id. Canon 3E(1).
67. For example, Supreme Court confirmation hearings are replete with
incantatory statements by the nominee and his supporters that if confirmed, he
will "follow the law as enacted by the legislature and not make new law based on
his personal opinions."
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tent of law is impossible without resort to normative political
argument. In Hart's view, by contrast, it is possible to ascertain
the content of law empirically, but there may be a further normative question about the best way to prioritize or balance competing legal considerations. The problem is, therefore, whether
there is any point to having legal rules that seek to prevent the
influence of politics on judging.
One way to answer this question in the affirmative would be
to claim there is a difference between reasons of political morality that are relevant to deciding cases (Dworkin's reasons of
"principle") and political viewpoints that are irrelevant to the law
(Dworkin's reasons of "policy"). Judges who rely on excluded
policy reasons could be sanctioned for failure of impartiality,
while preserving the ability of judges to rely on included reasons
of principle in deciding cases. But Dworkin's own argument
shows that this is an untenable strategy. The principles/policy
distinction would have to be drawn either by something like
Hart's rule of recognition, which differentiates law from non-law
as a matter of social fact, or by substantive political argument.
As noted above, Dworkin favors the latter strategy, but if
moral arguments are required to ascertain the content of law,
then it seems unfair for any theorist to exclude a category of reasons ab initio. To do so would be to beg the question the argument is aimed at establishing. Thus, a Dworkinian style ofjudicial
ethics would have to forego limitations on judicial activities and
speech aimed at securing a separation between politics and the
judicial role. Even if it is possible to differentiate between
included and excluded reasons on the basis of social facts, nonlegal political reasons would still enter into the process of deciding cases, via the standards judges employ for determining
acceptable methods of interpreting and applying the law. The
only way to deny this claim is to adhere to an implausible
mechanical or formal conception of judging, which holds that
judges really are just the mouthpiece of the impersonal, objective
law. (This is position (3), above.) At least in common law systems,
however, it is commonly believed that judges can and do vary in
their approaches to legal interpretation and that these variations
can correlate with political viewpoints. For example, the Republican judge in the hypothetical might favor an interpretive methodology that sees courts as having a limited role in expanding
the rights of consumers, preferring to leave the expansion of
existing rights or the creation of new rights to the legislature. A
Democratic judge, by contrast, might believe it appropriate for
judges to read precedents broadly and to emphasize the expansion of existing rights and the creation of new ones.
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I believe the right approach to judicial ethics is to focus on
the application side of the distinction between the content of law
(which may or may not be susceptible of determination on the
basis of social facts) and standards for its application. Where
there are multiple plausible interpretations of existing cases, statutes, and other applicable legal norms, all we can reasonably
expect is that a judge will deliberate in good faith and reach the
conclusion she believes represents the best reading of the governing law.6" The subject of judicial ethics is essentially an
attempt to flesh out the idea of judging in good faith. That, I
suggest, is fundamentally about being prepared to give reasons in
justification of a judicial decision. Labeling these reasons as
"legal" or "political" is less helpful than simply requiring judges
to articulate them to a real or hypothetical audience of competent observers. As long as a judge's ideological beliefs are germane to legal interpretation, I see no reason to regard judging
on this basis as a failure of impartiality, as long as the judge in
question is prepared to justify her decision as a constructive
interpretation of authoritative texts (cases, statutes, regulations,
and the like) in light of the political principles that would best
explain and justify them.6 9 If the argument given by the judge
refers to the sorts of reasons that other judges, lawyers, and legal
scholars tend to find persuasive asjustifications,then the judge is
acting ethically. If the only basis for a judge's decision was that
she thought the result was more socially desirable, or accorded
with her ideological commitments, the judge's decision would be
unjustifiable to others. It is important to see that a judge is not
required to persuade observers that her decision is the only right
one; it is enough for the judge to give reasons to believe that her
interpretation is a plausible one, which could be reached on the
basis of the reasons given.
Legal systems may be expected to vary in the institutional
mechanisms they employ to ensure that a judge's decision is
defensible on the basis of legal reasons. In common law systems,
judges in appellate courts are ordinarily expected to publish written opinions giving reasons for their decision. Appellate judges
may dispense with this requirement only in routine, uncontroversial cases. Trial court judges are not required to provide written
explanations for their decisions, but as a practice they frequently
do, particularly when ruling on motions that can affect the outcome of the litigation. In the French civil law system, academics
perform the reason-giving function assigned to judges in com68.
69.

Greenawalt, supra note 7, at 377.
See DWORKIN, supra note 23, at 185, 217-20, 225-28.
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mon law systems. "In the case notes published alongside important judicial decisions, French academics explain the courts'
latest decisions, place them in the context of the past and present jurisprudence, and thereby play an important role in the
explanation and dissemination ... ofjudicial norms and eventually legal rules."7 In both common and civil law systems, therefore, reason giving is regarded as a fundamental aspect of
adjudication. Judicial reasoning may be more or less transparent
in these systems, but it serves the same constraining function. A
decision based purely on partisan affiliation or ideological preferences, with no foundation in the law, would not be justifiable
to the relevant audience of well-informed judges, lawyers, and
academics.
V.

CONCLUSION

If failures ofjudicial impartiality are kept in check by institutional mechanisms that require reason-giving by judges, there
seems to be little point in having rules ofjudicial ethics that regulate the political speech and affiliation of judges. In the United
States, at least, there is a tendency for these rules to obscure the
real issues in judicial ethics. For example, Justice Scalia was criticized for stating in a speech to a conservative audience that he
believed it was not a violation of the constitutional separation of
church and state to require public school children to state their
allegiance to one nation "under God."'" He subsequently voluntarily recused himself from deciding a case questioning the constitutionality of requiring children to recite the pledge,
concluding that his impartiality could reasonably be questioned.7" Many commentators approved of this outcome, arguing
that Scalia was correct to recuse himself because of his partiality,
and that his conservative beliefs would have foreordained his
vote in the case.7" But notice what happened in the litigation: the
Supreme Court reversed a federal appeals court's decision that
the pledge's "under God" language was unconstitutional," and
legal scholars for the most part agreed that its decision was cor70.

LASSER, supra note 16, at 191.

71. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court to Consider Case on 'Under
God' in Pledge to Flag,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2003, at Al.
72. See id.
73. See, e.g., Dahlia Lithwick, Scaliapalooza: The Supreme Court's Pocket Jeremiah, St.xTE, Oct. 30, 2003, http://www.slate.com/id/2090532/. But see, e.g.,
Matthew J. Franck, Ducking Common Sense, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Feb. 9, 2004,

http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/franck200402090906.asp.
74. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 5 (2004).
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rect. 71 In other words, Scalia's position was correct-or at the
very least defensible in good faith-as an interpretation of the
governing law. His vote might have been causally determined by
his political commitments or his religious beliefs, but it was justifiable on the basis of law. The Supreme Court decision reversing
the lower court was unanimous, including four judges generally
regarded as left leaning, two centrists, and two conservatives.
Thus, a rule requiringJustice Scalia's disqualification in this case
seems overinclusive. Rules that sweep this broadly may be justified in legal systems which do not have effective institutional
mechanisms for ensuring that a decision is justifiable on legal
grounds. In the systems with which I am familiar, however, the
requirement that judges give reasons for their decisions is a sufficient guarantee of impartiality.

75. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings,
ShouldJudges Care?, 60 STAN. L. REv. 155, 156 (2007) (speculating that the Court
ducked the constitutional issue in Newdow to avoid the possibility of outraging
people with its decision); see also Robert Audi, Religion and PublicEducation in a
ConstitutionalDemocracy, 93 VA. L. REv. 1175, 1178-79 (2007) (reviewing KENT
GREENAWALT, DOES GOD BELONG IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS? (2005)); Richard W. Garnett, Religion, Division, and the First Amendment, 94 GEO. L.J. 1667, 1700 (2006)
(noting that Justice O'Connor would have preferred to reach the substantive

constitutional question, while the majority preferred to duck such a divisive
issue).

